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possibilities." Along the same lines, Heidegger3 writes: "It is not the
case that objects are first present as bare realities, as objects in some
natural state, and that they then in the course of our experience re
ceive the garb of a value-character, so they do not have to run around
naked." From the point of view of an unloving [read: affectively flat]
observer, it would not even be self-evident that the external world
exists. (p. 101; the first quotation is from Jonathan Lear)
Emotions all presuppose some kind of concern, some kind of caring about
things; but in this sense even hatred is lo v e-lo v e of the destruction or
suffering of what one hates. The other concept of love, the one that oper
ates in the conclusion that something is lovable, is in the neighborhood of
Christian agape; such a love, if it were true, could function as the ground
of an excellent character and life. Furtak is aware of this distinction and
writes of "love [being] cultivated into a caring, unselfish disposition" (p.
121; see p. 98), but we would like to see careful analysis of the distinc
tion and of how the one kind of "love" may develop into the other. I say
"at least" two concepts of love are run together, because others are also
relevant to the discussion. Kierkegaard distinguishes preferential love
from neighbor love (agape), and of course there are different kinds of
preferential love-friendship, family affection, romantic attachment. But
Furtak does not clarify and use these distinctions. Nor does he deal with
the problem, in Kierkegaard interpretation, of the accessibility of agape
to human experience. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard says that neighborlove was not known to paganism, implying that it is known only through
Christian revelation; but he sometimes also seems to treat it as though it
is naturally accessible.

Paradox in Christian Theology: An Analysis of Its Presence, Character, and
Epistemic Status, by James Anderson. Paternoster Theological Monographs,
2007. Pp. xii + 328. $43 (paper).
DALE TUGGY, SUNY Fredonia
As far as I know, this book is the all-time most sophisticated, well devel
oped, and plausible defense of the idea that Christians may rationally be
lieve and know apparently contradictory doctrines. Theological literature
on "mysteries" is too often marred with unclarity, epistemic carelessness
and confusion, and even mystery-mongering, that is, perverse delight in
inconsistency (apparent and/or real). In contrast, this book by a philosoph
ically informed and capable young theologian sparkles with Plantingian
clarity, sobriety, intellectual honesty, originality, and analytic power (and
also, with a lot of Plantingian epistemology, as we'll see.)
3Heidegger's 'Sorge' seems a better term for the generalized disposition that lies
at the basis of all emotional life than 'love.' Sorge (as directed at contingent states
of affairs) is more properly the opposite of Stoic apatheia.
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Anderson's ambitious project cuts against the grain of most contempo
rary philosophical theology. Consider the following inconsistent triad:
C: If some claim appears after careful reflection to be contradictory I
shouldn't believe it.
O: The orthodox Christian doctrine of X appears after careful reflec
tion to be contradictory.
B: I should believe the orthodox Christian doctrine of X.
What to do in the face of such a conundrum? There are three popular
responses.
Most current-day philosophical theologians—or at any rate, many of
the most prominent among them—habitually reject O (while affirming C
and B), offering some plausible interpretation of X on which X comes out
apparently consistent. Anderson, along with probably many theologians
and other believers outside the profession of philosophy, rejects this move,
as he holds that the reinterpreted X is in fact always out of line with (1) the
mainstream of the historic Christian tradition, (2) the ecumenical creeds,
rightly interpreted according to the intentions of their framers, and (3) the
Bible itself.
A second response is to reject the Orthodox version of doctrine X; that
is, reject B (keeping C and O). Theology is inherently conservative, and
in keeping with this tendency, Anderson will have none of it, equating it
with an abandonment of Christianity.
The third response is to reject C (keeping B and O); this is Anderson's
position, which for lack of a better term I call a "mysterian" stance. He at
tributes adherence to C to "rationalism," to a prideful preference for our
own intuitions over against the clear deliverances of scripture. What is
surprising and refreshing is the epistemological sophistication he brings
to play in developing and defending this mysterian stance.
The book proceeds as follows. A "paradox" is an apparently contra
dictory claim. (pp. 5-6) The orthodox doctrines of the Trinity and the In
carnation, according to Anderson, are paradoxes. In the second and third
chapters he recounts the development of these doctrines in the fourth and
fifth centuries, and relentlessly dismisses recent attempts to render these
doctrines seemingly consistent, by the likes of Barth, Rahner, Cornelius
Plantinga, Swinburne, Brown, Martinich, Rea, Brower, Feenstra, Davis,
and Morris. He argues that "those interpretations purporting to avoid
both paradox and heterodoxy inevitably fail on at least one of the two
counts" (p. 105).
In the fourth chapter he convincingly argues against several alterna
tives to his mysterian stance: theological anti-realism, anti-deductivism
(i.e., qualifying the laws of logic), dialetheism, doctrinal revisionism (i.e.,
my second response to the inconsistent triad above), what he calls seman
tic minimalism (claiming that the content of the doctrine in question is
too vague to be even apparently contradictory), and the science-inspired
theory of "complementarity."
The long fifth chapter starts with a beautiful exposition of Alvin Plantinga's epistemology. He locates an ambiguity in the role of the Bible in
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Plantinga's epistemology of Christian belief, and suggests some fixes (pp.
181-189). He points out that in Warranted Christian Belief Plantinga is only
trying to offer a model of how Christians might be warranted in believing
what Plantinga calls "the main lines of the Christian story" (pp. 189-190).
Contrary to Anderson, Plantinga assumes that there are orthodox and ap
parently consistent versions of the Trinity and Incarnation doctrines (p.
215). Moreover, Plantinga's "extended A/C" (Aquinas-Calvin) model cov
ers only beliefs based on the explicit content of the Bible, and not creedal
doctrines which are (in Anderson's view) based on the explicit and implicit
teachings therein (pp. 190-191, 209). Anderson aims to fill this gap.
Anderson thus extends Plantinga's theory further, in the fifth and
sixth chapters, to cover how Christian beliefs may, if Christianity is true,
be warranted, both for sophisticates and for ordinary believers. While
this involves some Reformed assumptions about scripture and tradition,
Anderson claims that these are not obviously essential to the success of
the project. Basically, if Christianity is true, it is plausible to think that a
believer could be warranted in taking the Bible to be a reliable commu
nication from God. And Christian beliefs may be directly or indirectly
based on the Bible.
But, comes the objection, if a doctrine appears to be contradictory,
shouldn't that trump its claim to be part of a divine revelation? Even if,
say, Chrissy Christian's belief in the Trinity were warranted, wouldn't the
realization that the doctrine seems contradictory give Chrissy a "defeater" for her trinitarian belief? Anderson takes the bull by the horns here,
deploying the whole machinery of undercutting vs. rebutting defeaters,
defeater-defeaters, and defeater-insulators. He argues that a warranted
belief in divine incomprehensibility will prevent one's beliefs regarding
the Trinity and Incarnation from defeat by one's belief that they seem in
consistent (pp. 250-256). (More on this crucial point below.)
In the sixth chapter, Anderson gives the heart of his account of our
knowledge of "mysteries," what he calls his RAPT (Rational Affirmation
of Paradoxical Theology) theory. He argues that we should take apparent
contradictions in orthodox Christian theology to be MACRUEs (Merely
Apparent Contradictions Resulting from Unarticulated Equivocation).
When we cannot find adequate terms to express some proposition, we
are sometimes driven to assert what appears to be a contradiction, such as
"I'm concerned about my wife's operation, and I'm not concerned about
my wife's operation" (p. 222). This is a MACRUE, and it in fact expresses
a truth, hence a consistent proposition, despite appearances. The equivo
cation here is in the term "concerned"; he is concerned in that he cares
about what happens to his wife, but he's not concerned in the sense of be
ing worried about the outcome, as he knows the surgeon to be extremely
competent (p. 223).
Here though, as Anderson points out, we can grasp both meanings
of "concerned" which constitute the equivocation. But theological cases
are more worrisome. One paradox he examines is: "God is one divine be
ing and God is three divine beings" (p. 226). None of those terms appear
equivocal, and yet at least one must be, if that statement is to only appear
to express a contradiction. Anderson tries out slapping subscript numbers
on various terms (e.g., "God is one divine1 being and God is three divine2
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beings."), but that seems ad hoc, and worse, it seems empty—the epitome
of a merely formal or verbal solution to a very real difficulty.
Anderson argues that this move isn't ad hoc because if God is incom
prehensible (as nearly all Christians grant), then we should expect ap
parent contradictions to arise in our thinking and speaking about him
(pp. 237-243). Moreover, all of this, Anderson argues, fits well with a
doctrine of analogy, in light of which we can see that the disambiguated
terms needn't be devoid of meaning. Rather, they each have a meaning
which partially, but not completely, overlaps how we use those terms in
ordinary contexts.
In sum, if Christianity were true, we would expect that Christians
would reasonably believe in and know about "mysteries," where a "mys
tery" is "a metaphysical state o f affairs the revelation of which appears implicitly
contradictory to us on account o f present limitations in our cognitive apparatus
and thus resists systematic description in a perspicuously consistent manner" (p.
245, original italics). Facts are mysterious in the primary sense, then, and
doctrines are mysterious derivatively, insofar as they are about these sorts
of facts (p. 246). Note that Anderson avoids the hard to justify claim that a
"mystery" is permanently beyond human capacities. The seventh chapter
tangles, somewhat less convincingly, with other objections to his mysterian position on the Trinity and Incarnation, and the eighth chapter briefly
summarizes his project and suggests a few implications of it for biblical
interpretation and apologetics.
A project this ambitious bristles with difficulties, but here I can only
sketch out a central one. Anderson's project seems to crucially involve the
following non sequitur: (1) If God exists, then God is incomprehensible.
(2) Therefore, if God exists, then it is likely that humans in thinking about
God along the lines of God's self-revelation in the Bible will be forced into
apparently contradictory thoughts and statements. The problem is that (2)
does not follow from (1), because Anderson's doctrine of "divine incom
prehensibility" is just the uncontroversial claim that "although God can be
known in part, he cannot be known fully and exhaustively" (p. 237). That
is a very weak claim, to which probably no theist will object. Given our
limited information, the probability of God's putting us in a paradoxical
theological situation is inscrutable, not more probable than not. A child
may not understand the sexual aspect of her parents' relationship, but
it does not follow that she will probably run into paradoxes in thinking
about her parents. Whether she does or not depends on her cognitive ca
pacities, on precisely what information her parents choose to reveal, and
perhaps on her own free choices concerning how she reflects on her par
ents' relationship. It only follows from divine incomprehensibility that we
cannot be sure or anything close to it that we will never run into paradoxes
in theology. Non-mysterians, it seems to me, can happily admit this, and
proceed in their non-mysterian ways.
But if we lack the grounds to expect theological paradoxes, then the clear
and stable appearance of contradiction seems to provide an undefeated defeater for the warrant and justification of our paradoxical theological claims
after all. (Cf. p. 252) Without a stronger doctrine of incomprehensibility,
there is no way to rule out that our cherished paradoxes have been created
by our misguided speculations or wrongheaded scriptural exegesis, rather
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than being thrust on us by transcendent facts together with our epistemic
limits. In sum, it is not clear that the mysterian response to my inconsistent
triad above fares better than the other two. Would a stronger doctrine of
divine incomprehensibility be worth the price?
This book deserves to be widely read by students of theology, philosophy
of religion, and apologetics. It is nicely written, organized, and presented,
and features a good index, and only very few (insignificant) typographical
errors. It would provide ideal material for graduate level seminars in any
of the aforementioned fields. Some readers will, like this reviewer, take this
book to suggest that the mysterian defense of Christian belief is a philo
sophical dead end, while others will take it as presenting an exciting, wellmotivated, and genuinely different apologetic option. Either way, there's
apt material for reflection here, whether one is trying to come up with a
defeater-defeater-defeater, or trying to shore up the mysterian defenses.

The God of Metaphysics: Being a Study of the Metaphysics and Religious Doctrines
of Spinoza, Hegel, Kierkegaard, T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, Josiah Royce,
A. N. Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne, and Concluding with a Defence of Pantheistic
Idealism, by T. L. S. Sprigge. Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. 576. $99.00.
WILLIAM LAD SESSIONS, Washington and Lee University
This is an old-fashioned book, in many ways, and not just in its massive
subtitle. Its subject, point of view, and position are all unfashionable, to be
sure. But it is out of joint with the philosophical times in many other ways:
it is a very long monograph in an era of journal pieces and books that are
little more than collections of those pieces (Professor Sprigge confesses
that he "is not a great reader of philosophical articles . . . just as I avoid
reading short stories. Neither of these forms allows one to immerse one
self in another's world, but acts only so as to jerk one out of one's own."
[p. viii]); its style is leisurely and discursive, eschewing precise formaliza
tion even when presenting complex arguments; its idioms are often from
another era; its masculine pronouns are politically incorrect; it lavishes
attention on philosophers mostly ignored or forgotten today (Green, Bo
sanquet, Royce); and it takes seriously views rarely considered, much less
defended in public anymore. In this Age of Naturalism, Professor Sprigge
is a resolute defender of Absolute Idealism, something many believe ex
pired in the nineteenth century. "Personally," he says, "I see no more rea
son why a nineteenth-century thinker might not be right as against what
seems undeniable common sense today" (p. 111).
I confess to having enjoyed reading this weighty tome, in daily mod
eration. It has much to interest an open-minded contemporary reader. I
would divide the book into three basic parts (versus Sprigge's ten chap
ters). First, Sprigge sketches the problematical relation of the God of the
metaphysicians to the God of religion, asking both whether a notion of
God metaphysically derived overlaps or is congruent with religious con
ceptions of God and also whether a metaphysical God can serve religious

